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Graduate Institute of 
International Studies, Geneva
Seventh World Congress of Sociology 
Varna, September 1970
The article discusses the present day activism of the Greek 
armed forces (from an admittedly partisan point of view) in 
terms of the social class and ideological nature of the armed 
forces, the past relationships between the Greek ruling class 
and the military, and the importance of Greece’s role within 
the NATO alliance. Arguing that the present «dictatorship» 
represents a qualitatively different type of activism for the 
Greek military, the author reaches some tentative conclusions 
as to how and why the military government maintains itself 
in power. [j. Chernoff]
A
Political activism of the Greek armed forces dates 
back to the first decade of our century. The forms of 
and motivations for this political activism have varied 
greatly but, in spite of the often decisive effect of 
their interventions in Greek political affairs, the Greek 
military have not yet become the object of any serious 
scientific scrutiny. The reasons for this situation are 
numerous, but they all fall under the following headings :
a) the underdevelopment of the Social Sciences in 
Greece, even before April, 1967 (and their total sup­
pression today);
b) the tradition of partisan political analysis which 
characterised the pre-scientific study of Greek politics;
c) the fears and inhibitions plaguing those rare stu­
dents of Greek politics who, at times, were indeed 
tempted to analyse the action of the military in our 
national political life.
However, some notable exception to this pattern 
may be found in the recent writings by Greek 
scholars in exile, such as George Catephores and 
Phedon Vegleris,1 as well as in the earlier works of 
Jean Meynaud.2 The situation in Greece since April 
1967 which has given rise to an urgent need to explain 
how and why the military coup d’état took place and, 
even more so, how and why the Junta maintains 
itself in power renders such studies necessary than 
ever. Although the role of the military in Greek pol- 
tics should be considered by social scientists as an 
object of scientific inquiry, this writer cannot claim 
a dispassioned view of Greek political reality. Such 
an attitude is shared by most, if not all of our Greek 
colleagues. The fate of democracy is too important 
a stake to leave Greek social scientists indifferent; 
but hasn’t this always been the case under totalitarian 
regimes? All we can say is that in the very interest of 
the cause of democracy we strive towards as much 
scientific rigour as possible. As Gunnar Myrdal has 
written «scientific truth is wholesome» and, we would
1. See in particular: G. Catephores, «L'organisation institu­
tionnelle d’une'société défensive’ en Grèce», in Temps Modernes, 
No. 276bis, 1969 and P. Vegleris, «La dictature grecque et sa 
conception de la défense nationale», in Revue du Droit p ublicet de 
la Science politique en France et à l’étranger, mai-juin, 1970.
2. J. Meynaud, Les Forces Politiques en Grèce, Etudes 
de Science Politique, No. 10, Montréal and Rapport sur l’abo­
lition de la Démocratie en Grèce, Etudes de Science Politique, 
Montréal, octobre 1967.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 07:06:03 |
Έπιθεώρησις Κοινωνικών Ερευνών a καί β' τρίμηνον 1971
add, it serves the interests of a cause such as the 
restauration of democracy in Greece.
B
In analysing the present day activism of the Greek 
armed forces, we must avoid a common error, or 
deliberate misrepresentation of history, which we 
find in many official or quasi-official pronouncements 
concerning the Greek dictatorship. Those who want 
to «explain» the present situation by simply «re­
minding» their audiences, who very often know 
little about Greek history, that «military dictatorships 
have been a recurrent phenomenon in Greek politics 
since the beginning of the twentieth century» neglect 
to point out the very important fact that the present 
dictatorship represents a qualitatively different type 
of military activism. In the course of our discussion 
of the role of the military, since 1967, these differences 
will become apparent. At this stage, however, we shall 
simply point out the salient characteristics of past 
interventions of the military in Greek politics.
1. During the twentieth century, the armed forces, or 
a seizable section thereof, intervened in Greek poli­
tics on five occasions: in 1909, 1917, 1922, 1935 
and 1943-1944. They were successful the first three 
times but they failed in 1935 and in 1943-1944.3 In 
1909, the «Military League» was basically an expres­
sion of republican and nationalist bourgeois forces 
which brought to power Eleftherios Venizelos. The 
same was largely true in 1917, although we should 
not neglect the role played by the Allies, and particu­
larly by the French, in bringing about the success 
of the «National Defence» government. In 1922, the 
overthrow of the royalist government and the exile 
of King Constantine by the armed forces, led by the 
republican officers around colonels Plastiras and 
Gonatas was in many respects an attempt to carry 
out the pledges of the 1909 rebels which had been set 
aside by Venizelos’ conciliatory policies towards the 
Monarchy. By 1935, many of the young officers of 
1909, and particularly of 1922, had reached the senior 
ranks and they led once again a rebellion against those 
in government who were proposing the return of the 
King. Although the leaders of the 1935 rebellion were 
in close touch with Venizelos, his advice was not 
heeded and they failed. The monarchy was restored 
a few months later but, during the Second World
3. In the 1920’s and 1930’s, Greece witnessed several at­
tempts—successful and unsuccessful—by small groups of of­
ficers to take over power. These were, at times, military putsch 
led by «caudillos», but without the support of any significant 
sector of the armed forces, while on other occasions small 
groups of officers allied themselves with certain politicians in 
short-lived attempts to exert a decisive influence on the course 
of political events. To that extent they differed from the other 
military interventions which, whethersuccessful ornot, didhave
a more lasting impact on Greek politics.
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War, in 1943-1944, a majority of the free Greek armed 
forces fighting with the Allies in the Near East ral­
lied once again in order to prevent the return of the 
King to Greece after its liberation. This last rebellion 
differed from the previous ones to the extent that it 
had been initiated by communist led soldiers’ and non­
commissioned officers’ organizations, although several 
senior officers folio wed their troops and shared the con­
sequences of their defeat in the prison camps of Egypt.
2. These five military rebellions have in common the 
pursuit of republican and anti-monarchist political 
objectives, and the first three, at least, were an ex­
pression of strong nationalist convictions within the 
officers’ corps which resented the «national humili­
ations» to which Greece had been subjected by «a 
foreign inspired Monarchy». However, in 1935 and 
in 1943-1944 the rebellions were more directly «po­
liticai» in their objectives and we could agree with the 
Greek historian Daphnis when he states the defeat 
of the 1935 movement is the turning point in the 
political evolution of contemporary Greece.4
For more than a generation, the Greek armed 
forces were important political actors, in pursuit of 
two major objectives. The expansion of Greece’s 
frontiers to include all territories inhabited by Greek 
populations and the instauration or preservation of 
a republican form of government, (or at least the 
curtailment of the Monarchy’s political powers). 
Given the alignement of Greek political forces, such 
initiatives on the part of the military had in the past 
the active or tacit support of either a majority or a 
very large minority of the people. The military, who 
led these rebellions, on the other hand, were con­
vinced that they were the guardians of Greece’s 
national interests and of Greek democracy. They 
were not seeking any personal benefits and most of 
them went into retirement considerably poorer than 
when they first became involved in political activities. 
They were often romantic and almost always im­
petuous; but they were brave soldiers who fought 
all of Greece’s wars from 1912 to 1922 and those who 
were able to do so came out of retirement in 1939- 
1940 to fight once again either on the side of the Al­
lies or in the resistance. They could not visualize the 
need for «apolitical» armed forces because they were 
convinced that they represented the last rampart of 
democracy in Greece.
3. Following the defeat of the 1935 rebellion, that of 
the 1943-1944 insurrectionary movements and, above 
all, the civil war of 1946-1949, the Greek armed forces 
were progressively purged of all their republican or 
even moderately liberal elements. Their political com­
plexion in 1950 was almost diametrically opposed 
to that of fifteen years earlier. The primacy of the
4. Daphnis, Gregorios, I Hellas metaxi dyo Polemôn, Wol. 
II, Athens, Ikaros, 1955, p. 280.
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Monarchy was reestablished and even those officers 
who in their youth may have had anti-royalist lean­
ings found that they had to proclaim loudly their al­
legiance to the King in order to retain their posts. 
Shortly before his death in 1964, King Paul, when 
addressing the officers of the Salonica garrison, told 
them: «I belong to you and you belong to me.» This 
almost mystical identification of the King with the 
armed forces reflected a much more real control exer­
cised by those who were commonly included under 
the heading of «Royal Court», while the civilian par­
liamentary governments—whether those of Mr. 
Karamanlis or Mr. Papandreou—were only formally 
responsible for the conduct of Greek military policy.5
At the same time, the Greek military entered a 
new era, when Greece joined NATO. We shall be 
discussing this question in greater detail below but, 
for the time being, we should simply stress the im­
portance for the Greek armed forces’ political role 
of their participation in the NATO structure, which 
coincided with their «cleansing» of all republican 
and liberal elements. As a consequence, the armed 
forces which were faced on April 21, 1967 with the 
coup perpetrated by a small group of middle level 
officers felt a triple loyalty to NATO, to the King and 
to the Nation, in precisely that hierarchic order.
4. In concluding this brief historical reminder, we 
should stress once again that at the time of the 1967 
coup d’état the Greek armed forces had indeed under­
gone a profound transformation. On the one hand, 
they had become part of the largest alliance system 
in history and of its military establishment; and, on 
the other, they had been purged of all those elements 
which could have considered the violation of consti­
tutional order by a small clique of officers as an intol­
erable intervention of the military in Greece’s politics.
C
In the absence of any empirical studies on this sub­
ject, it is not easy to discuss the evolution of the social 
and political composition of the Greek officers’ 
corps. We have to rely essentially on our knowledge 
of history, on biographical data for some of the more 
prominent officers and on a first hand acquaintance 
with officers belonging to three different generations.
Contemporary Greek society may be roughly di­
vided into three social classes: The small peasants 
(large land-owners were rare even before the land- 
reform in the 1920’s); the urban workers (manual and 
white-collar) and the urban bourgeoisie. The wealthier 
elements in the small towns and villages may be con-
5. After 1960, we can observe a slight revival of liberal at­
titudes among officers of all ranks and in the three services. 
This trend, however, didn’t assume any organised form and, 
in the face of the organised extreme right within the services, 
its role was négligeable. Most of these officers have naturally 
been eliminated since 1967.
sidered as a distinct social group but, generally speak­
ing, their aspirations and loyalties tend to be iden­
tified with those of the bourgeoisie. Even though at­
tempts have been made in the past to create—alto­
gether artificially—an image of a Greek «aristocracy», 
no such social group has ever existed in Greece; to 
the great distress of former Queen Frederica and others 
belonging to the «Royal Court» coterie. As for the large 
land-owners, they never did constitute a distinct social 
class because even before the land-reform they were 
generally resident in the cities—particularly in Athens— 
and they tended to identify with the urban bourgeoisie.
To this extent, the social origin of the Greek of­
ficers’ corps differed substantially from those of 
other European countries—including the Balkans. 
They were neither the children of the rural or urban 
aristocracies—as in France or Germany—nor of 
the landowners, as in many central European or 
Balkan countries. Up to the second world war, they 
were largely the children of the upper social strata 
in the provinces or of the urban bourgeoisie. Very 
often, the same family included professionals or 
businessmen and officers. Before the first world war, 
many of the most competent officers were sent to 
training courses in Germany—and more rarely to 
France—while after 1919—and specially during 
the republican period of 1924-1935—they were sent 
to France. Naval and Air Force officers were also 
trained in the United Kingdom. At the risk of over­
simplifying the situation, we could say that those who 
had close relations with Germany—General Metaxas 
for instance—were generally monarchist and reaction­
ary. While those who studied in France, or were con­
nected with the Allied military missions during and 
after the first world war, were generally republican and 
liberal. In both cases, however, theofficers were socially 
part of the bourgeoisie which ruled the country and, 
from a political point of view, they sided with one or 
the other of the two major competing political forces. 
Thus their participation in the social and political life 
of the country was a «natural» consequence of their 
status as members of the establishment.6
6. Such a statement may be questioned because we can offer 
no empirical data to support it. Is it possible to generalise and 
state that «the officers» belonged to the establishment? Even in 
the absence of such data, however, we can simply say that 
certainly those of senior rank either belonged to the establish­
ment orbecame part of it, or at least identified with its interests 
and aspirations as soon as they reached the senior levels of the 
military hierarchy. As for the junior officers, we can say that 
no matter what their class origins and their ideology, they cer­
tainly never represented a force opposed to the political estab­
lishment as a whole and, at no time, did they take any action 
running contrary to the position adopted by their superiors. 
Considering the importance of hierarchic relationships in the 
armed forces, our proposition concerning the officers’ corps 
within the establishment seems justified. We can only hope that 
such propositions, as well as many others in this paper, will 
become hypotheses in order to verify them empirically.
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To the extent that the military were, in the past, 
largely members of the establishment, their political 
activism never endangered the foundations of the 
country’s political power structure. Even when the 
interventions of the military resulted in considerable 
violence, as in 1922, such actions had no significant 
long term political consequences. Those who led the 
various Greek political forces, as well as those who 
were in charge of the administration, were part of the 
establishment and their succession in government, 
with or without the assistance of the military, did not 
affect the political structure of Greek society. In this 
context, the military were political but not social 
actors. They aligned themselves with one of the other 
of the two major competing political forces, or they 
took independent initiatives, but these actions were 
always contained within the limits of «politics» (in 
the narrow sense of the term) leaving the political as 
well as the socio-economic structure of the country 
basically unchanged. In this respect, up to the second 
world war, the military, whether or not they partici­
pated in political interventions, may be considered 
as servants and guardians of the establishment to 
which most of them belonged.
Writing in 1964, during the period when Greece 
was governed by the Center Union Party led by 
George Papandreou, Jean Meynaud explained that 
«en définitive, l’armée est aujourd’hui la garantie de 
l’ordre social et il est probable qu’elle interviendrait 
très vite en accord avec l’OTAN, si cet ordre lui 
semblait réellement menacé».7 In our view, this state­
ment must be questioned, at least with the benefit 
of hindsight.
If any threat to the established order existed 
during the years 1963-1967, it certainly was not 
against its social or economic components. As Mr. 
Catephores so aptly stated in 19698 the motivations 
of those who took over power in April, 1967 were 
much more directly «politicai» and they were not the 
result of any fear that the social order was in danger. 
However, before we have a glance at the «ideology» 
of the Colonels, which will give us some insight as 
to their motivations, we should ask ourselves who 
they are socially and politically; as compared to the 
«traditional» leadership of the Greek Armed Forces.
If we consider the small group of officers who 
actually engineered and carried out the coup—and 
their number does not exceed forty—we see that 
none of them belonged, even in the remotest way, 
to the Greek establishment. In a much wider sense, 
however, we would suggest that since the second
7. Meynaud, Jean, Les forces politiques en Grèce,op.eit., p.350.
8. Catephores, George, Greece and the Institutionalization 
of a Defence society, (additional note to this Report), p. 25 ff. 
[Ed.: Mr. Catephores’ article is not published here as he was 
not present at the Congress to give or deny his permission.]
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world war, the social composition of the Greek of­
ficers’ corps had been very largely modified to in­
clude an ever increasing number of recruits of peasant 
or small bourgeois origins (mainly from small towns). 
During the civil war, 1946-1949, the officers’ training 
schools put on «crash courses» and several classes 
were commissioned after only a few months’ training. 
Earlier, many of the most qualified elements in all 
three services had either been killed during the various 
phases of the second world war or had been elimi­
nated through several purges of democratic of­
ficers between 1943 and 1946. Finally, the rate of 
voluntary early retirement, particularly in the Navy 
and Air Force, was very high immediately following 
the end of the war. The reasons for such retirements 
are varied but one of the most important ones is 
that the economy was in need of qualified adminis­
trators and of men with technological skills, many of 
whom were serving in the Armed Forces.
The consequences of these changes may be sum­
marized as follows:
a) The numbers of officers who were commission­
ed in the 1946-1950 period were so high that the whole 
hierarchic pyramid was distorted. By 1965, these of­
ficers had reached, given «normal» promotion con­
ditions, the rank of major but further promotion 
became a real problem because of the limited number 
of more senior posts. We would therefore suggest 
that the desire for social advancement through career 
promotion, and the anxiety lest they may not achieve 
it, must be taken into consideration when we discuss 
the social structure of the officers’ corps.
b) This anxiety was all the more real and justified 
as the only perspective open to them was promotion 
or stagnation. Their social origins did not offer them 
any possibility to return to civilian life and enjoy a 
family income, as did very often their predecessors 
when they had to leave or were excluded temporarily 
from the armed forces. In addition, if the skills of 
an officer could be used in various walks of life in an 
underdeveloped country—as was Greece during the 
first half of the twentieth century—this was no 
longer true after the end of the civil war, in view of 
the growth of the economy and the transformation 
of the country into a semi-developed one.
c) For many different reasons, the children of the 
bourgeoisie no longer joined the armed forces. This 
has been less true for the Navy and Air Force than 
for the Army, but even these two services have lost 
much of their glamour and attraction for the children 
of the establishment. Those officers who belonged 
to the establishment were definitely a minority at the 
time of the coup and even the generals who led the 
armed forces were not, in reality, members of the 
Greek ruling class. Many of the general officers had 
personal relations with the King but these were more
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of a «professional» nature and they did not «open 
the doors» of the establishment.
d) Most of the generals, in 1967, had fought in the 
civil war but very few had taken part in the struggle 
against the Axis either within the Resistance or in 
North Africa. Among the colonels, lieutenant-colonels 
and majors very few had taken part in the Resistance, 
on the North African and Italian campaigns, while the 
captains had never fought. All of them, however, had 
in common the civil war experience—either because 
they fought in it or because they had been nurtured 
with the militant anti-communism which was the 
center-piece of the post-civil war «ideology» with 
which the Greek armed forces were imbued. The ma­
jority of officers, who refused to adopt a critical at­
titude towards this primitive «Weltanschauung»— 
even if many of them understood that the time had 
come to abandon the pursuit of the communist 
«bogeyman»—, sooner or later mistook for reality the 
wild ramblings of the psychological warfare specialists.
e) In spite of their social origins, the bulk of the 
Greek officers’ corps do not entertain any revolu­
tionary or even reformist aspirations comparable 
to those of the nationalist groups who have taken 
over power in the past in Egypt, Syria, Libya or 
Peru. Their visceral anti-communism prevents them 
from adopting such positions, and they are pre­
pared not only to maintain but to reinforce the out­
dated social and economic structure of the country, 
provided that those who control the economy are 
prepared to support them in the pursuit of their 
political objectives. Similarly, their total identification 
with the world’s anti-communist crusaders prevents 
them from taking any measures which can be termed 
as nationalist, in the way this term is applied to the 
military rulers of some of the underdeveloped countries.
f) Finally, we should stress the importance of the 
ties established between the Greek officers andtheU.S. 
military establishment. Their advanced training took 
place, since 1949-1950, almost solely in U.S. or NATO 
military schools and their identification with the values 
shared by the military in the U.S. has been an increas­
ingly important factor in determining their behaviour.
We can therefore conclude that although the social 
origins of the Greek officers’ corps, as it has develop­
ed since the second world war, are such that one could 
possibly expect on their part a «radical» outlook on 
economic and social issues, their political indoctri­
nation and their professional aspirations have led them 
to use all possible means to destroy the political com­
ponent of the establishment, while leaving intact and 
even reinforcingthecountry’s socio-economic structure.
D
The Colonels’ attempts to develop an «ideological» 
foundation for the militarist regime which they have
established, have often led the Greeks and many 
foreigners to an attitude of incredulity and, unfor­
tunately much too often, to a refusal to take seriously 
the inept declarations of the semi-literate leaders of 
present day Greece. We would suggest, however, that 
these «ideological» postures, taken together with the 
progressive institutionalisation of a totalitarian-mili­
tarist regime, deserve more attention. Their incoherent 
ramblings are now part of the school curricula and 
hundreds of thousands of volumes are being printed 
and distributed freely to the population. In the long 
run this indoctrination will start producing some ef­
fects, in spite of the Greek people’s aversion for such 
propaganda and its deeply rooted scepticism towards 
any pronouncements of the Junta.
The inner core of this militarist «ideology» is repre­
sented by the concept of «Nation» as distinct from, 
if not opposed to, the «People». According to the 
pronouncements and writings of the present rulers 
of Greece, the «Nation» is not to be identified with 
the «People»; the will of the people is one thing, the 
will of those who are entrusted with the defence of 
«national interests» is another. The latter, that is the 
military, cannot be subject to the same legal order as 
the ordinary people. Their mission is such that they 
must be in a position to act «in the Nation’s interests», 
without being hampered by civilians who have to 
take into account the will of the people.9
Greece and theGreeks possess some superior quality, 
as compared to other nations and peoples, for reasons 
which are largely biological. It is therefore the duty of 
Greece to transmit«i ts message» to all other countries of 
the world. On April 9,1969, Colonel Pattakos spoke as 
follows to a group of U.S. officials and journalists:«A 
new star shines in the Western skies. The American 
star. Europe should accept its bright light, without any 
jealousy or reservations... American wisdom may be 
identified with the modest wisdom of Eurypides. The 
United States is part of Europe; while Europe and the 
United States are part of Greece. The western star 
may change its position in the horizon of civilisation, 
but it is always the same one. The source of its light 
is in Greece. Because of our civilisation we are all 
Greeks. And as Greeks,10 if you feel a summer breeze 
which inspired your mind and your soul while you 
were among us, you should take to your noble country 
the message of the New Greek Spring. This message 
will be a contribution to the unity of the West, for 
Freedom and World Peace, as these are expressed 
by the Idea (Spirit) of Greece.»
9. The length of this paper does not allow any substantial 
quotation of texts. In addition, the Greek language used by the 
Colonels is often incomprehensible, even to the Greek reader. 
Our brief analysis of their «ideology» is however based on a 
careful reading of their pronouncements and legal texts pub­
lished since April, 1967.
10. He was addressing U.S. citizens.
33
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This meshing of Greek «nationalism» and an un­
conditional attachment to the «Western World» is 
one of the principal characteristics of the regime’s 
«ideology» and one which was not invented after 
April 21, 1967. For almost two decades, the Greek 
Armed Forces have been nurtured with the idea that 
any struggle in the Greek «national interest» is at the 
same time a struggle «for the West» against the 
common, identifiable enemy. Its corollary was also 
considered to be an absolute truth; and, in the late 
fifties, the Armed Forces Radio network proclaimed 
that «Greece’s frontiers are in the Caucasus». In 
other words, the borders of Greece extended to those 
of the members of NATO. This statement was made 
at a time of serious tension between Turkey and 
Greece. One could therefore doubt the value of the 
«nationalism» which the Greek military proclaim. 
It is certainly not the nationalism of the people, be­
cause according to the Junta the people are in no 
position to act on their own in defence of Greece’s 
national interests. It is rather an attempt to appeal 
to some of the more backward sectors of Greek 
society by arousing primitive feelings of «national 
pride», while at the same time proclaiming that 
Greece’s national aspirations are totally identifiable 
to those of the Alliance.11 The very fact of this iden­
tification makes any contradiction between Greece’s 
national interest and the interest of NATO as a 
whole unthinkable, at least in the Junta’s frame of 
reasoning. If any such contradiction were to arise in 
the course of events, the Junta’s ideologists would 
eliminate it by simply stating that it cannot possibly 
exist, and then proceed to follow the injunctions that 
may come from abroad.
The «theory of the State» and the place of dissent 
and civil liberties in relation to «State power» pro­
claimed by the Colonels were well summarized in a 
statement by Prime Minister Papadopoulos on 25 
April, 1968: «The State is an organised body and I 
would like to suggest that within an organised body 
only expressions of support and understanding can 
be authorised.» The totalitarian character of the 
State which the colonels would like to establish—
11. The contradiction between this attachment to the «West» 
and the denigration of «corrupt western Europeans»—par­
liamentarians, the people, the governments or the press—does 
not seem to worry the Colonels. To them the «West» with a 
capital «W» exists in abstracto while those who inhabit the 
countries, for whose defence NATO was established, can be 
ignored if they don’t appreciate fully the greatness of the Greek 
regime. We have in this case a reasoning which is similar to 
that which they apply when they establish a distinction between 
the Nation, with a capital «N» and the people. The «Nation» 
and the «West» are undefined «ideas» which may or may not 
find their concrete expression in the will of the people. It is 
therefore indispensable for the armed forces to be entrusted 
with the defence of the «Nation’s interests» as well as of those 
of the «Western World».
and are already in the process of doing so—is re­
flected not only in their statements but, particularly 
so, in the 1968 «Constitution» and subsequent 
«Laws» they have adopted in order to implement it. 
It is impossible in the space of this paper to enumerate 
all the legal texts which are, in our view, expressions 
of a totalitarian «ideology». We would like, however, 
to refer to the next section and to Mr. Catephores’ 
additional note in order to illustrate just one point: 
to the Colonels who rule Greece today it is clear 
that they are endowed with a mission to «save» the 
Greek nation—even from the Greek people—similar 
to the one which was shared by Salazar during the 
better part of his thirty-eight years in power. They 
are not as literate as the Portuguese dictator was and 
their pronouncements have something which is more 
ridiculous than frightful about them—but a careful 
reading of their texts (specially of their legal texts) 
reflects a truly totalitarian way of thinking.
The last important pillar of their «ideology» is to 
be found in their references to the role of religion. 
On March 29, 1968, Prime Minister Papadopoulos 
proclaimed urbi et orbi that «Greece belongs to the 
Greek Christians». This slogan was proclaimed as 
a national motto, which has since then been inscribed 
on stamps, city walls, bus windows, public parks, 
etc. In using the name of Christianity in such a way, 
the Junta was helped by the official Greek Church; 
and particularly by its head, Archbishop Ieronymos. 
With the help of the Church leadership, this slogan 
was interpreted to mean that all that is Greek is 
Christian, ignoring the fact that about 100,000 Greek 
citizens are not Christian and that the majority of 
the population, even though born Christian, maintain 
very loose relations with the Church.
In short, the portrait of the ideal Greek mind, in 
the eyes of those who rule the country in 1970, is 
the following:
a) He believes in the sanctity of the «Nation», but 
he does not claim for himself the right to decide when 
it is in danger and more generally the right to pass 
judgement on its state.
b) He is convinced that the world is divided into 
«forces of good» (NATO and the «Western World») 
and «forces of evil» (the Communist countries, all 
communist or leftist movements, the socialists, the 
left-wing Christian-Democrats, etc.). He does not 
claim for himself the right to decide which country 
or group belongs to one or the other.
c) Those who are in charge of Greece’s destiny 
today have all the answers to questions which may 
arise under a) and b).
d) He supports and understands the efforts of those 
who act on behalf of the State, because otherwise he 
would be contributing to its dissolution.
e) He is a good Christian and no matter what the
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holy texts, canon law or his local priest may say, 
the Archbishop of Athens is always right.
When beginning to draft this section of the paper, 
we had not intended to use our sense of humour, 
because this author at least is convinced that no matter 
how ridiculous and inept the Colonels’ «ideological» 
pronouncements may sound to a non-mentally re­
tarded individual, they are expressions of a potential 
danger not only to Greece but to many countries 
which may still enjoy a democratic form of govern­
ment. Thus, if some of the above paragraphs appear 
to be sarcastic, this is not because we take the matter 
lightly.
This manichean view of society and the return to 
the old established social values, such as religion, 
are not uncommon to wide sections of the military, 
even in the West’s most democratic societies. Italy, 
Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, have all witnessed such trends 
within their armed forces and, more particularly, 
among officers who deal with psychological warfare 
questions. In this connection, we should not forget 
that before the April 1967 coup, Colonel Papadopou­
los served for a long time in the psychological warfare 
office of the General Staff. Should we, however, be 
surprised to read and listen to these «ideological» 
pronouncements? In our view, certainly not. This kind 
of «thinking» prevailed in the Greek armed forces for 
a long time. Even under democratic governments, the 
military carried out such propaganda whenever they 
were in control of the means of communication. If 
these means allowed them to carry their «message» 
beyond the limits of their barracks—as they did 
through the Armed Forces Radio network—they 
never hesitated to do so. Their pronouncements have 
not really changed; they simply make them today as 
«statesmen» and no longer as sergeants or colonels. 
In the same way, many a statesman in our democratic 
societies would be well advised to look into the bar­
racks and listen to what is being said; lest he finds 
himself replaced by officers whose sophistication and 
literacy would be no greater than those of Greece’s 
present rulers.
E
In our attempt to understand the exact nature of the 
Colonels’ political design, we must now examine brief­
ly some of the institutions which they have established 
since 1967 and which have transformed Greece—at 
least from a formal point of view—into one of the 
world’s most completely militarised states. This has 
been done through the promulgation, during the past 
three and a half years, of a series of «legal» texts 
which deserve careful analysis because of the complex 
institutional structure to which they have given rise. 
The fear of a return to a democratic system of govern­
ment has led the Colonels to introduce, as often as 
possible, «legal» provisions which make of the mili­
tary the arbiters of public life. In a complementary, 
but not unimportant manner considerable material 
advantages accrue to the military as a result of this 
institutionalisation of what George Catephores has 
called a «defence society».
The most important of these texts are the Constitu­
tion of September 1968, and the December 14, 1968, 
Decree regulating the structure and powers of the 
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The careful 
analysis of these texts should normally be part of a 
paper such as ours. We have, however, been spared 
this task because of two recent publications on this 
subject12 and the fact that we have obtained permission 
to reproduce an unpublished text by Mr. Catephores.
As for the more peripheral aspects of this milita­
rization process, another recent short study by C. 
Vassiliou13 contains much useful documentary ma­
terial. In summary, we should however stress the 
following:
1) Since April, 1967, a systematic attempt is being 
made to place members of the officers’ corps—retired 
or not—in as many positions of responsibility as 
possible. Most often this is done by the simple ap­
pointment of officers to governmental or para­
governmental posts. Thus, most of the Public Cor­
porations, Social Welfare institutions, Cultural and 
Scientific institutions and, more particularly, the Uni­
versities have been or are being placed under the 
direct control of the military. Naturally, all sections 
of the Administration have also been placed under their 
control through the appointment of Permanent Secre­
taries and Directors General. The limits of such ap­
pointments are determined by the Junta’s natural 
desire to place in these positions only men whom 
it can trust, as well as the need to satisfy the am­
bitions of its rare civilian supporters.
2) These discretionary appointments are important 
because of their cumulative effects; but what is by 
far more important is the legislation making it man­
datory to appoint officers of senior rank to an ever 
increasing number of boards, councils and positions 
of administrative responsibility. In several cases, the 
appointment of a member of the armed services to a 
given position is made possible though not mandatory. 
The Colonels’ practice has been, however, consistent 
in always choosing an officer even when the law 
makes such a choice only optional. A typical example 
is to be found in the implementation of Decree No. 
ND /180 (April 30, 1969) «concerning Government 
Commissioners in Higher Education Institutions»
12. Catephores, George, op. cit. and Vegleris Pheäon,op.cit.
13. Vassiliou, Constantine, in Eleftheri Patricia, No. 131, 
Rome, (reprinted in English in Greek Report, No. 16, May 
1970, London).
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which provides for the possibility to appoint «a mili­
tary official» to such a post. According to C. Vas- 
siliou, and to our knowledge, all appointees have 
been generals or officers of senior rank. As for the 
cases where the appointment is mandatory, we can 
cite the examples of the boards of the Atomic Energy 
Commission, the Telecommunications Corporation, 
several bodies in the field of sports, etc.
3) The distinction between the armed forces on the 
one hand and other uniformed services, such as the 
security forces and the fire service on the other, has 
been practically abolished by the progressive assimila­
tion and control of the latter by the former. The 
Supreme Council of National Defence appoints the 
heads of these various services (Decree ND /58 /1968), 
while their respective Supreme Councils are com­
posed of a majority of Army Officers of General rank 
(Decree ND/139, April 3, 1969). In other terms, all 
these branches of public administration have become 
totally subordinate to and are under the complete 
control of the Armed Forces and, more particularly, 
of the Army.
4) The creation of a post of «Archpriest of the 
Armed Forces», with the rank of Major General has 
extended and reinforced the military grip on the 
Church. His principal function is to advise the Chief 
of the Armed Forces on religious matters and on 
«the Greek-Christian enlightenment of Armed Forces» 
(Royal Decree BD 217, April 7, 1969), but his re­
ligious position as a metropolitan and ex officio mem­
ber of the Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church 
places a General in the very ranks of the governing 
body of the Church.
This progressive «institutionalisation of a defence 
society» follows two parallel paths. The first leads to 
the air-tight separation between two sectors of Govern­
ment. On the one hand, National Defence, in the 
way the term is being used in Greece today and, on 
the other, all the rest.14 The second one consists of the 
steady increase of the numbers of officers occupying 
key positions in the «other» sector of government. 
The meaning of the Junta’s pronouncements that 
the Armed Forces must remain «free of political in­
fluences» and their «independence» established and 
guaranteed in the future becomes apparent when we 
compare them to the practice of ever increasing mili­
tary control and domination over all walks of public 
life. When the military become involved—by the very 
fact that they occupy positions of responsibility in all 
civilian sectors—in controversies and conflicts re­
lating to football teams, the Church or the casting 
of actors in the National Theatre is it possible to ex­
pect the civilians to remain indifferent about what is 
going on inside the Armed Forces? There is, however, 
a more serious side to this situation. As S. E. Finer
14. See Vegleris, Phedon, op. cit., pp. 583-589.
has so aptly stated, the military are neither technical­
ly nor morally equipped to govern and administer.15 
The examples he cites from the experience of the 
Allied Government in Germany where the degree of 
sophistication, education and intelligence of the mili­
tary personnel had nothing in common with the primi­
tive thinking which guides the military who rule 
Greece today are particularly probing in this respect.
Obviously, any democratic government which will 
one day succeed the Colonels will have the right and 
duty to abolish this legislation and lead the military 
back to where they belong: their barracks. However, 
the complexity of the institutional structure establish­
ed since 1967 and the web of petty and vital interests 
which are now at stake is such that this task will be 
particularly arduous. The obsession with «law-mak­
ing» which characterises the Junta’s government of 
the country is not fortuitous; they know from Greek 
history how difficult it is for a democratic govern­
ment to rid itself of the undemocratic legal straight- 
jackets which it has inherited.
F
At the end of what was intended to be a series of 
notes on the military in contemporary Greek politics, 
it is almost impossible to draw any conclusions.
We have seen that, from several points of view, the 
present dictatorship and the April, 1967 coup differ 
qualitatively from previous involvements of the mili­
tary in Greece’s politics. Nonetheless, many features 
of the pre-1967 Greek state and governments were 
conducive to the establishment of this type of dictator­
ship, because of the deliberate maintenance of prac­
tices dating back to the civil war. From a social 
point of view, the officers who carried out the 1967 
coup were not part of the establishment but their 
militant anti-communism and other aspects of this 
«ideology», as well as their close ties with the U.S. 
military establishment prevent them from adopting 
«Nasserite» or simply Nationalist positions. Insti­
tutionally, the Junta’s «legislators» have worked hard 
in the past and are continuing to work towards the 
establishment of a totalitarian militaristic and mili­
tarised state.
We have not, however, even attempted to answer 
one major question: Whom is this dictatorship serv­
ing and in whose interests did the Colonels act 
when moving to take over power? Is it possible to 
point to a given social class or group in answering 
this question? A serious discussion of these questions 
is warranted, both from a scientific and from a policy 
oriented point of view, but, within the limits of this 
paper, we can only suggest possible answers.
From a scientific point of view, this discussion is 
important because through an analysis of the role of
15. Finer, S. E., op. cit., pp. 14-17.
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functionally specific, though very often socially het­
erogenous groups, such as the military, we can have 
a fresh look at some of the «traditional» outlooks and 
theories on social stratification and class structure. 
The comparative study of the role of the military 
in contemporary societies is of value to the extent 
that it sheds some light on the new social relation­
ships developing in different societies, under the impact 
of apparently comparable or similar transformations 
of the function and role of certain social groups.16
From a more practical point of view, it is impor­
tant to determine the position of the Colonels who 
control Greece today in the overall structure of 
Greek society. It is obvious that no political action is 
possible unless the relationships between the mili­
tary in power and other social groups and classes are 
determined with some certainty.
One simple answer is to point to the capitalists 
in Greece, or to the Greek bourgeoisie and claim that 
the Colonels acted on their behalf and that the dicta­
torship is serving their interests. Such attempts at 
establishing the «class nature» of the Junta have 
been made, although, in this writer’s view, they are 
little more than crude pseudo-marxist improvisations. 
There is no doubt, however, that because the road 
leading to April 21, 1967 was largely paved by the 
various «ancien régime» governments and adminis­
trations which were effectively controlled by the bour­
geoisie, these theses do carry some credibility in the 
eyes of those who have forgotten the legend of the 
sorcerer’s apprentice.
A variant of this view tends to place more emphasis 
on the role of «foreign capitalism» in bringing about 
and maintaining the dictatorship in power. It is the 
«imperialists» — without specifying what this term 
means — who are the firm supporters of the Greek 
Junta and the best way to oppose it is through an 
«active struggle against imperialism».
These and many other explanations of the Greek 
dictatorship do not take, however, into account the 
changing role of the military and their new rela­
tionships with other social groups. The traditional 
radical view of the military acting as agents of the 
capitalists who want to produce and sell weapons and 
who follow expansionist foreign policies is still shared 
by many Greeks. Consequently, they see the Junta 
as an outgrowth of the capitalist system, with all its 
indigenous and foreign spider webs.
John Galbraith, writing on the relationship be­
tween the Pentagon and U.S. industries, replied in­
directly to many such explanations: «That we should
16. In this connection, we should also note that, in our view,
such comparisons are possible only if we take account of the
type of society as well as the functional position of the military. 
The participation in an alliance system is certainly as important
a variable as the levels of socio-economic development.
pretend that the big specialized military contractors, 
those that do all or the bulk of their business with 
the Pentagon, much of it as the only source of supply, 
are really private firms—a stalwart manifestation of 
private enterprise—seems to me a unique bit of non­
sense. There would be many advantages in recognizing 
the reality, which is that they are public extensions of 
the Pentagon... In my view the Services, not their indus­
trial suppliers, are the prime wielders of power. Only 
a ubiquitous and often unconscious Marxism causes 
us to assume that if there is a capitalist in the back­
ground he must be more powerful.»17
By analogy, we would be tempted to say that in 
Greece, today, some capitalists—particularly the ship­
owners—and some other elements of the bourgeoisie 
have become «extensions» of the Junta but, by no 
means, are they the Junta’s masters, in any sense 
whatsoever.
Another American writer, Seymour Melman, has 
had to face the same question in his analysis of the 
Pentagon’s relationship to U.S. capitalism.18 After re­
jecting the establishment view that this relationship 
is a perfectly normal one between private suppliers 
and public purchasers, as well as the pseudo or neo- 
Marxist view that the capitalists call the tune and the 
military act as their faithful agents, he suggests that 
these outlooks have in common the hypothesis that 
civilian interests are predominant over the military. 
Robert Heilbronner, in reviewing Melman’s book sum­
marises a third possibility as follows: «It is that the 
military establishment has constituted itself as a self- 
contained entity, capable of impressing its views and 
imposing its will not only on the civil establishment 
to which it pays a ritual obeisance, but over a section 
of the economy in which the language of private en­
terprise, is merely a fiction to hide its absolute author­
ity.»19 The consequence of this state of affairs accord­
ing to Melman, is that a «para-state» has come into 
being in the United States which is leading the country 
to the point when it will become a «garrison-state».
Melman’s «garrison-state» and Marcuse’s «defence- 
society» are qualifications which apply very aptly 
to the kind of socio-political structure which the Colo­
nels are in the process of establishing in Greece; 
but this conclusion still does not answer the question 
we posed at the beginning of this section. We would 
suggest that the answer may be given only by setting 
aside the explanations which derive from models of 
civil-military relations which are no longer applicable. 
With the exception of the ship-owners, some bankers
17. Galbraith, John K., How to Control the Military, New 
York, Signet Books, 1969, pp. 9-10.
18. Melman, Seymour, Pentagon Capitalism. The Political 
Economy of War, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1970.
19. Heilbronner, Robert, «Military America», in New 
York Review of Books, Vol. XV, No. 2, July, 23, 1970, p. 6.
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and very few industrialists, Greek capitalists did not 
benefit from the coup d’état. On the contrary, the 
threats to Greece’s economy, stemming from European 
hostility to the dictatorship—which has not been 
replaced by any significant enthusiasm for invest­
ments in Greece by U.S. financial circles—are serious 
enough to make Greek industrialists and exporters 
think twice about the virtues of the Junta. At the same 
time, the political and social expressions of the Greek 
establishment—political parties and professional or­
ganisations of all sorts—have been suppressed merci­
lessly by the Colonels and, three and half years after 
the coup, the rulers of Greece fear even the slightest 
sign of a renewal of their activities. Even the mili­
tary establishment, traditionally linked to the King 
and to the royal coterie, has been destroyed and most 
of its leading members have either been retired, are 
in exile or in prison.
Immediately following the military take-over, many 
of those who have become since then objects of the 
Junta’s vindictiveness as well as of those who have 
freely chosen to oppose it were favourably inclined 
towards temporary military rule. As long as this 
initial mutual tolerance lasted, one could have mis­
taken it for actual collusion between the Greek ruling 
class and the Colonels. After the first few months, 
however, and particularly after December 1967, it 
became clear that even if some «marriages of rea­
son» did take place, the Greek establishment and the 
Colonels remained very far apart.
But then, whose interests did the coup and the 
dictatorship serve? First of all, those of the Colonels 
themselves and those of their immediate military and 
civilian acolytes. They succeeded in April 1967, not 
because they were acting on behalf, or with the as­
sistance of any notable section of the Greek ruling 
class, but because they controlled the military tech­
nology with which the Greek armed forces had been 
endowed by its allies and which enabled them to 
place the whole country under their control. They 
have, since then, drawn tremendous personal bene­
fits from the new status quo and their attempts at 
using the patronage system are yielding their fruit in 
the armed forces and, to a much lesser extent, among 
certain sectors of the civilian population.
Their real strength lies, however, in the fact that 
they have inherited a situation in which the Greek 
establishment had—at least since the civil war—always 
subordinated its own actions to the «mood» of the 
armed forces. It was not the establishment—capital­
ists or politicians—who were ordering the military 
but rather the military and their constant ally (or 
patron), the King, who were indicating the limits 
within which the establishment could act. This state
of affairs was a consequence of the civil war and of 
the militant anti-communist crusading spirit which 
was its legacy—the military being its keepers—and the 
Colonels’ intention to build up a fully fledged «gar­
rison-state» is only the logical conclusion of a process 
dating back to the post-world war period.
Nonetheless, in spite of these internal conditions, 
the dictatorship, in its present form, would not have 
been possible if the Greek military were not part of a 
much larger military establishment, that of the NATO 
alliance. Without suggesting that NATO as an organ­
isation, or for that matter that the political deci­
sion-makers of any member country, have at any 
stage deliberately encouraged the establishment or 
maintenance in power of the military dictatorship, 
the conviction of the Greek military that they belong 
to an alliance which will never disavow the Colonels 
is probably the most important factor in any attempt 
to explain the Greek dictatorship. Although we have 
no serious reason to believe that the Junta benefits 
from the active support of the civilian sectors of gov­
ernment in the member countries, there is no doubt 
that such support has been offered unhesitatingly 
since the first days of May 1967, by the U.S. military 
and intelligence establishments and, to a much lesser 
extent, by some sections of the military establish­
ments of other member countries.
This reality, in as much as it relates to the situation 
inside Greece as well as to its external aspects, is 
much more complex and difficult to face than a simple 
causal relationship between the «capitalist forces» and 
their military agents. Both from a theoretical and from 
a practical point of view, its implications are likely 
to disturb many preconceived patterns of thinking. It 
is, nevertheless, preferable to face it and draw the 
conclusions which it calls for.
In summary then, we can answer our question by 
saying that the dictatorship did not serve the interests 
of a social group other than of the military themselves. 
Their strength, which has enabled them to remain in 
power, lies in the fact that past relationships between 
the Greek ruling class and the military were such 
that the latter found it easy to exploit the inhibitions 
of the former. It is also, however, the consequence of 
the functional role of the military, of the high tech­
nological sophistication of some of them and of the 
means at their disposal. Finally, their insertion into a 
larger alliance system, whose military establishment is 
basically favourable to their political aims and views, 
gives them a feeling of security which the politically 
isolated, if not ostracized rulers of a small country 
like Greece would otherwise be lacking.
Geneva, July, 1970
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